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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGHf 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is there substantial competent evidence in the record 
that the parties agreed that plaintiff would be required to 
only provide all her "time and talents" to the partnership and 
that defendant would be required to bear the entire financial 
burden, or did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Trial 
Court's Finding No. 6. 
2. Was the distribution of the capital assets in error. 
3. Is the question of the rights of unmarried cohabitat-
ing parties one that should be decided by this Court. 
REFERENCE TO OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion, contained in a Memorandum 
Decision marked "not for publication," is found in the 
Appendix. 
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JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
The decision sought to be reviewed was filed July 13, 
1988. An order denying the plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing 
was dated and filed July 27, 1988. By order of this Court the 
time for filing this Petition was extended to October 14, 
1988. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the 
decision in this matter by a writ of certiorari pursuant to 
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The plaintiff (Miss Hough) originally filed for divorce 
alleging that she was the common law wife of the defendant 
(Dr. Colley) R. 2-3. Miss Hough later amended her complaint 
to include a claim that a partnership existed between Dr. 
Colley and herself. She asked for an accounting and a dis-
solution of that partnership. R. 19-37. Dr. Colley answered 
and counterclaimed, denying the existence of both the common 
law marriage and the partnership, but alleged that if there 
was a partnership he should have judgment against the plain-
tiff for the amount by which his contributions exceeded hers. 
R. 41-49. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the court dis-
missed plaintiff's claim of a common law marriage, no cause of 
action, but found that there was a partnership relating to 
certain parcels of real property purchased after the parties 
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commenced residing in Utah. The court determined that Miss 
Houghfs obligation to the partnership was to devote all of her 
time and talents, but that Dr. Colley was obligated to provide 
all of the money. The court ordered the real property sold 
and the proceeds used to pay off some, but not all, of the 
mortgages relating to those properties; the balance of funds 
was to be divided equally between the parties. R. 1082-1083. 
The court ordered the partnership terminated and the proceeds 
divided as of March 11, 1985, the date of the court's memo-
randum decision. R. 938-940 T. Vol, III, p. 11-12. The court 
refused, however, to require that Dr. Colley be reimbursed for 
the expenses that he had incurred with relation to the pro-
perties between the time that Miss Hough abandoned them and 
the date of the court's decision. 
Plaintiff and defendant both appealed from the judgment of 
the trial court; however, the decision of the District Court 
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals by memorandum decision 
filed July 13, 1988. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff and defendant commenced living together in 
Galveston, Texas in August, 1971 while both were students at 
the University of Texas. At that time plaintiff was unemploy-
ed and remained so throughout her association with defendant 
The only mortgages that were not paid were those relating 
to funds borrowed from Dr. Colley's retirement trust. 
-3-
in Texas. The parties' arrangement was to share expenses and 
utilities. T. Vol. I, p. 6-8. Within a few weeks, however, a 
2 
sexual relationship developed. In the spring of 1972, defen-
dant received his medical degree and moved to Philadelphia. 
Miss Hough subsequently graduated in occupational therapy and 
joined defendant in Philadelphia. Plaintiff obtained employ-
ment as an occupational therapist, defendant was employed as a 
medical doctor. T. Vol. I, p. 120. Thereafter, the parties 
lived together and pursued their individual careers in 
Pennsylvania, Montana, Arkansas and Colorado before coming to 
Utah. T. Vol, II, p. 105-106. Defendant arrived in Utah in 
December, 1975; plaintiff in early 1976. While in Utah the 
parties continued to pursue their separate careers. T. Vo1. 
U p . 105, 128, 137, 286. Plaintiff, however, became dissatis-
fied with being an occupational therapist and in the spring of 
1978 changed her career to that of a realtor. She made her 
first real estate sale in the "latter part of 1978." T. Vo 1. 
I, p. 70-71. Since then she has been highly successful in 
that field. T. Vol. I, p. 152. After arriving in Utah, the 
parties commenced purchasing real property located primarily 
in this state. The property was originally titled in their 
Plaintiff described her relationship with defendant at 
that point as "very heated". T. Vol. I, p. 8. 
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joint names. As a general rule, a portion of the purchase 
price was borrowed from the retirement trust of defendant's 
professional corporation. T. Vol. II, p. 132, 306; Ex* 94. 
The balance of the price was either provided through a 
mortgage or a real estate contract. Although Miss Hough 
initially managed some of the Utah properties, a professional 
manager was soon hired who assumed the managerial duties. T. 
Vol. I, p. 59. The parties continued to reside together until 
October 30, 1981, when Miss Hough walked out. Throughout 
their association, defendant provided a substantial majority 
of the funds. T. Vol. II, p. 337, 338. After Miss Hough 
left, Dr. Colley made payments on the properties totaling 
$146,247.00. T. Vol. II, p. 172-173. Plaintiff paid only 
$4,200.00, T. Vol. I, p. 173, although during that same period 
of time she acquired substantial assets in her own name. T. 
Vol. I, p. 128-130, 135-136, 179-182. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
WOULD DEVOTE ALL OF HER TIME AND TALENTS TO THE 
PROPERTY AND DEFENDANT WOULD CONTRIBUTE MONEY BUT 
THAT THEY BOTH WOULD SHARE ON AN EQUAL BASIS IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
The trial court's Finding No. 6 was pivotal to its 
refusal to order a partnership accounting. The court's scheme 
of distribution was also premised upon that finding. Defen-
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dant submits, however, that the fundamental elements of Find-
ing No. 6 are not supported by competent evidence in the 
record. 
A. The record is devoid of any evidence that the 
defendant agreed to assume the entire financial obligation of 
the parties. The defendant is not unmindful of the burden 
that he bears on this appeal. Harline v. Campbell, 720 P.2d 
980 (Utah 1986). Since the matter is eguitable, however, this 
Court has greater latitude in its review. Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374, (Utah 1980); Ingram v. Foster, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1977). The determination by the trial court that Dr. Colley 
was reguired to shoulder the entire financial obligation of 
the partnership while Miss Hough's duties were limited to her 
"time and talents" is not supported by competent evidence. In 
fact, it is not supported by any evidence in the record. 
In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Dr. Colley 
contended not only that the trial court's Finding No. 6 was in 
error, but also that the court erred in determining that a 
partnership existed between the parties. The defendant con-
tended that since a partnership requires the carrying on of a 
business for profit, Section 48-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
there could have been no partnership between the parties since 
they were unemployed college students, with no business enter-
prise, when they lived together in Texas. The Court of Appeals 
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brushed defendant's contention aside and went directly to the 
trial court's distribution scheme. From there it leap frogged 
over all of the trial court's findings of fact relating to the 
partnership issue, including Finding No. 6, and apparently 
assumed that since, in the Court o£ Appeals' opinion, there 
was competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of 
3 
a partnership, the rest of the trial court's findings must 
also be correct. 
Because the record in this case is voluminous, it is 
doubtful that the Court of Appeals, based upon its ruling, 
took the necessary time to read the entire record. The Court 
of Appeals cited to no evidence in the record, and to no 
testimony of any of the witnesses, in support of its holding 
that there was competent evidence to support Finding No. 6. 
The plaintiff herself has never cited to any evidence in the 
record that supports the finding by Judge Conder that Dr. 
Colley was solely responsible for the entire financial obliga-
tion of the partnership. Defendant submits that the notion 
that Miss Hough had no financial obligation to the partnership 
was erroneously create by the trial court without any support 
Neither Miss Hough, the trial court, or the Court of 
Appeals, however, has ever stated when or where the 
partnership was created. See T. Vol. Ill, p. 14. 
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4 in the evidence or record of this case. 
B. The plaintiff herself did not contend that her 
obligation to the partnership was limited to time and talent 
only. Even Miss Hough did not contend that her obligation to 
the partnership was limited only to her time and talents. She 
testified repeatedly that her obligation included a financial 
commitment. Referring to the time that the parties were in 
Texas, plaintiff testified: 
We both contributed everything. We contri-
buted all of our finances, we contributed all 
of our timef all of our talent, all of our 
efforts. R. Vol. I, p. 41 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff testified that their relationship in Pennsylvania 
also included a financial commitment. Miss Hough stated: 
It was our understanding, that all of our 
efforts, our financial efforts, our physical 
efforts, our intellectual efforts were to be 
combined so that we — our unit could grow. T. 
Vo1. I, p. 55 (emphasis added). 
Regarding their association in Utah, Miss Hough testified: 
We committed 100% of everything, our finances, 
our mental, physical, emotional efforts up to 
the time that we separated. We still had a 
Finding No. 6, is also inconsistent with the trial court's 
Finding No. 3, wherein it held that each of the parties 
committed his or her total time, efforts and talents to 
the partnership. Three paragraphs later, however, the 
court stated that the obligation of Miss Hough was re-
stricted to all of her time and talents only but that Dr. 
Colley was required to assume the entire financial burden. 
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tremendous amount of contact after that up 
until November, 1982 and still a lot of 
financial involvement, talking, but the combi-
nation was not what it had been prior to our 
separation. Prior to our separation it was 
100%. T. Vol. I, p. 175-176 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff also stated that: 
We combined all of our income into our 
accounts, and all of our efforts, all of our 
energies into a common pool. T. Vo1. I, p. 
144 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff freely admitted that her agreement with Dr. Colley 
required her to contribute all of her finances to their 
association. The record also shows that plaintiff did make 
financial contributions, Ex. Ill, clearly refuting any con-
tention that she had no monetary obligation to the partner-
ship. Plaintiff's own testimony, and the evidence, is clearly 
contrary to the trial court's Finding No. 6 and the Court of 
Appeals' decision. 
C. Miss Hough's obligation did not change. Miss 
Hough did not contend that her obligation to contribute money 
to the partnership ever changed. When asked, "Did the agree-
ment ever change so far as you understood it?" Miss Hough 
responded, "Never." T. Vol, I, p. 44. According to plain-
tiff's own testimony, therefore, she had an obligation to 
contribute not only her time, efforts, and talents, but her 
money as well to her association with Dr. Colley. In addi-
tion, according to plaintiff, that obligation never changed; 
therefore, the court's Finding No. 6 that plaintiff's obliga-
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tion somehow did change and that defendant somehow became 
solely obligated to put up all of the money while plaintiff 
was relieved from her obligation to contribute her finances 
but only had to provide "time and talent", is clearly contrary 
to the testimony of both of the parties in this matter is 
totally unsupported by the evidence and should have been 
reversed by the appellate court. 
D. A distribution of a portion of the capital assets 
of the partnership based upon plaintiff's time, talent and 
services is error. The trial court, relying on its disputed 
Finding No. 6, refused to order an accounting and determined 
that the time and services provided by Miss Hough matched the 
hard dollars contributed by Dr. Colley. The evidence was un-
controverted, however, that Dr. Colley had contributed ap-
proximately $228,356 more than Miss Hough during their time 
together. Ex. Ill. That figure gave Miss Hough credit for 
contributions of $101,489, the maximum amount she could have 
contributed based upon her income, although she could only 
document $61,000 worth of deposits to the parties1 account. 
Dr. Colley, on the other hand, had verified contributions in 
excess of $394,000. The court distributed one-half of the 
proceeds from the properties to each without regard to the 
disparity between the amount of money contributed to the 
partnership. In addition, it left Dr. Colley to repay a sub-
stantial portion of the $104,820.55, that has been borrowed 
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from his retirement trust to acquire the properties. 
The trial court's dissolution scheme also failed to 
reimburse Dr. Colley for the $146,000 he paid on the proper-
ties after Miss Hough walked out. Although it is uncontro-
verted that after that time she provided no time, talents, or 
services of any kind relating to the properties. T. Vol. II, 
p. 172-173; Ex. 111. 
It follows that since the court's Finding No. 6 was 
in error, its distribution scheme based upon that finding is 
also erroneous. If Miss Hough is entitled to any distribution 
from the partnership, she is entitled to a share of the pro-
fits, only after Dr. Colley's capital contributions have been 
returned to him, and the property loans have been repaid. It 
has been stated: 
Where one partner has contributed capital and 
the other services, the one contributing the 
capital is entitled to withdraw its value. 1_ 
S. Rowley on Partnerships, (2d ed. 1960) p. 
453. 
Under some circumstances personal services may constitute a 
capital contribution to a partnership; however, there must be a 
specific agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner who con-
tributes services is not entitled to share in the capital upon 
dissolution. Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1983). 
As has been noted elsewhere: 
A partner contributing only services and no 
capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share of 
capital on dissolution, the capital is return-
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ed to the partner supplying it. Tiffany v. 
Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943). 
The partner contributing only services is limited to his share of 
the profits of the enterprise as compensation for his services. 
Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, modified on other 
grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944). 
Generally where one partner contributes the capital of 
the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the partner 
who made the capital contribution is entitled, on dissolution, to 
repayment of such capital before any distribution of profits is 
made. A partner who furnishes no capital, but contributes merely 
time, skill and services, is not entitled on dissolution to any 
part of the original firm capital, but must look for compensation 
for such time and services to a share of the profits. Vassallo 
v. Sexauer, 22 Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970); Bass v. 
Daetwyler, 305 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 
152, 40 N.W.2d 649 (1950). 
In the instant case, the trial court, based upon its 
Finding No, 6, failed to require an accounting between the 
parties even though Miss Hough specifically requested one. R. 
19-37. It also failed to determine whether or not there were any 
profits to distribute. The trial court failed to properly apply 
the law since Miss Hough's distribution from the partnership, 
based upon her time and services, should have been limited to 
profits from the partnership only and not to capital contribu-
tions. If Finding No. 6 is upheld, Miss Hough would only be 
-12-
entitled to a share of the profits. If Miss Hough's obligation 
to contribute financially to the partnership is recognized then 
there cannot be a distribution without a proper accounting. As 
it now stands, however, Miss Hough has received the best of both 
worlds; a portion of the partnership's capital without an obliga-
tion to contribute to that capital. Defendant submits that this 
is error and is contrary to the evidence of this case and that 
the Court of Appeals erred in its affirmance of the distribution 
plan. 
E. Even if Finding No. 6 is properf the distribution 
scheme is in error and should have been reversed by the Court of 
Appeals because plaintiff did not devote all of her time and 
talents to the partnership. According to Finding No. 6, Miss 
Hough was obligated to devote all of her time and talents to the 
property. Not only is that finding unsupported by any competent 
evidence, the record shows that Miss Hough did not devote any 
substantial amount of time to the properties let alone "all" of 
her time and talents. She actively pursued her own career. T. 
Vol. II, p. 105, 137. She had no idea concerning the cost of 
maintenance or the negative cash flow generated by the proper-
ties. T. Vol. I, p. 100-101. She did not know which, if any, of 
the properties she had participated in locating. T. Vol. I, p. 
68-69. She did not know how much, if any, of her income went 
into the property account. T. Vol. I, p. 134. A manager super-
vised the properties. T. Vol. I, p. 59, 71-72. She provided no 
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evidence of how much time, if any, she devoted to the properties. 
Miss Hough kept monies that she received secret from Dr. Colley. 
T. Vol. II, p. 260-261, Ex. 78; T. Vol. I, p. 149-150. After she 
left, her efforts were directly exclusively toward the acquisi-
tion of personal wealth and gratification. T. Vol. II, p. 313, 
Ex. 73-76, 86-91, 100-104. She also acquired substantial assets 
in her own name rather than supporting the properties. T. Vo1 I, 
p. 128-130; Ex 102-104; T. Vol I, p. 203; Ex. 100-101. The trial 
court's refusal to order an accounting based upon its determina-
tion that Dr. Colley's financial investment was matched by Miss 
Hough's contribution of all of her time and talents is not sup-
ported by the record. The Court of Appeals' affirmance of that 
order is similarly erroneous. 
POINT II 
THE RIGHTS OF UNMARRIED COHABITORS IN UTAH IS 
ONE OF FIRST IMPRESSION AND IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION 
OF STATE LAW WHICH SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY THIS COURT 
The Court of Appeals refused to decide what, if any, 
rights or obligations unmarried cohabitating parties have in 
Utah with relation to property acquired and debts incurred dur-
ing, or as a result of, that cohabitation. 
A. Partnership law is inapplicable to unmarried 
cohabitors. Over the years, various theories have been advanced 
in an attempt to adjudicate the rights of unmarried, cohabitating 
adults. The most prominent case is Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 
660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), wherein the plain-
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tiff alleged an express contract with the defendant contending 
that she gave up a lucrative career so that she could provide 
domestic services to defendant in exchange for defendant's 
promise of support. In the instant case, however, Miss Hough did 
not claim an agreement for future support. In addition, she 
performed none of the traditional wifely duties. Household 
chores were done by a maid, cleaning lady and various other 
people. T. Vol. II, p. 182. The plaintiff did not assist the 
defendant in furthering his medical career. T. Vol. II, p. 737. 
Rather, Miss Hough enhanced her own career through the efforts of 
Dr. Colley. T. Vol. I, p. 70-71, 152; Vol. II, p. 124-125. 
In Marvin, the court upheld the claim of an express con-
tract and further stated that the plaintiff could, if she wished, 
amend her complaint to also allege an implied agreement of part-
nership. In deciding an analogous case, however, the New York 
Court of Appeals flatly rejected the implied partnership theory 
of Marvin finding it: 
to be conceptually so amorphous as practically 
to defy equitable enforcement and inconsistent 
with the legislative policy enunciated in 1933 
when common-law marriages were abolished in 
New York. Monroe v. Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 
407 N.E.2d 438 (1980). 
In Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 903 
(1979), the New Jersey court rejected the partnership theory 
in a case between unmarried adults who had cohabitated for 15 
years but did find an express agreement for future support 
-15-
based on the facts of that case. 
It was held in Chambers v. Crawford, 150 So. 2d 61 
(La. App. 1963), that where the initial motive and purpose of 
the parties1 coming together was cohabitation and where such 
relationship continued, there was no right of recovery based 
upon the theory of a partnership. 
Although the trial court found a partnership between 
the parties, the application of partnership principles between 
unmarried cohabitants has been generally rejected. See also, 
Neild v. Wolfe, III Misc. 2d 994, 445 N.Y.S.2d (1981) (living 
together as lovers does not create a partnership re: real 
property). 
B. An award to plaintiff is contrary to the public 
policy of this state. In Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 
S.E.2d 81 (1977), the alleged "wife" brought an action in 
equity for a portion of the property acquired during 18 years 
of cohabitation. Affirming a dismissal by the trial court, 
the supreme court stated: 
It is well settled that neither a court of law 
nor a court of equity will lend its aid to 
either party to a contract founded upon an 
illegal or immoral consideration . . . The 
parties being unmarried and the appellant 
having admitted the fact of cohabitation . . . 
this would constitute immoral consideration. 
Much of that opinion was founded upon the Illinois Court 
of Appeals decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454 
(111. Ct.App. 1978), which was subsequently reversed by 
its supreme court. 
-16-
See also, Wellmaker v, Roberts, 213 Ga. 740, 101 S.E.2d 712 
(1958). 
Miss Hough has admitted that she and the defendant 
lived together and that they had sexual intercourse. T. Vol. 
I, p. 7, 73-74. She further admitted that the "agreement" to 
become "partners" was arrived at after they started living 
together. T. Vol. I, p. 193. It appears, therefore, that 
plaintiff's claim is similarly based on immoral consideration 
and should have been dismissed. Another case in point is 
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). 
There the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the various 
philosophies of the case of Marvin v. Marvin, supra. In 
Hewitt, the plaintiff was an unmarried mother of three who 
sued the children's father, with whom she had lived for 15 
years, to recover an equal share of the property accumulated 
by the parties during that period. Unlike the instant case, 
the plaintiff there claimed that she had devoted her efforts 
to the defendant's professional education and the establish-
ment of his practice. The Illinois Supreme Court, neverthe-
less, held that the woman's claim was unenforceable for the 
reason that it contravened the public policy of the state 
which disfavored the grant of mutually enforceable property 
rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants. The Illinois court 
stated that public policy disfavored private contractual al-
ternatives to marriage. The Illinois court criticized the 
-17-
approach utilized by the California court in Marvin and stated 
that the issue of whether property rights accrued to unmarried 
cohabitants cannot be regarded realistically as merely a con-
tract law problem: 
There are major public policy questions 
involved in determining whether, under what 
circumstances, and to what extent it is 
desirable to accord some type of legal status 
to claims arising from such relationships. Of 
substantially greater importance than the 
rights of the immediate parties,- is the impact 
of such recognition upon our society and the 
institution of marriage. Id. at 1207. 6 
Marvin: 
Further the court stated that, with relation to 
it would seem more candid to acknowledge the 
return of varying forms of common law marriage 
then to continue displaying the naivete we 
believe involved in the assertion that there 
are involved in these relationships contracts 
separate and independent from the sexual 
activity. Id. at 1209. 
Continuing the court stated: 
the issue, realistically, is whether it is 
appropriate for this Court to grant a legal 
status to a private arrangement substituting 
for the institution of marriage sanctioned by 
the state. Id. 
The Court was concerned that if legal rights closely 
resembling those arising from conventional marriages can 
be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter 
into illicit or meritorious relationships, the formation 
of such relationships might be encouraged and that might 
weaken the marriage foundation of our family based 
society. 
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The state of Utah is a strong family based society 
and has a firm policy favoring marriage. In Hilton v* 
Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902), this Court observed 
that "marriage is the foundation of civilization and of the 
social system." Id. at 663. Although leniency is often shown 
to unmarried "spouses" in workman's compensation cases in 
other jurisdictions, See, H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations, 
p. 50, (1968), this Court has consistently refused to do so. 
Crenshaw v. Industrial Comm., 712 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985); 
Wengert v. Double 00 Hot Shot, 657 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1983).7 
It is thus apparent that the state of Utah has consistently 
asserted a strong interest in the institution of marriage and 
of the family. See, In re: Goalen, 30 Utah 2d 27, 572 P.2d 
1028 (1973), Hilton v. Roylance, supra. It would be inappro-
priate, based upon the public policy of this state, to afford 
legal status to claims arising from a meretricious relation-
ship. 
This Court stated that it has consistently held that a 




The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's 
judgment in this case. There is no evidence to support the 
trial court's Finding No. 6 that defendant had to bear the 
entire financial obligation of the parties while plaintiff was 
only required to provide "time and talents". The plaintiff's 
testimony and the evidence clearly refutes that contention. 
If Finding No. 6 falls, the Court's distribution scheme based 
upon that finding, must also fail. Any award to plaintiff 
based upon her meretricious relation with defendant is con-
trary to the public policy of this state. This Court should 
grant certiorari so that it can correct the erroneous ruling 
by the Court of Appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 1988. 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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I hereby certify that on this day of October, 1988, 
I hand-delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the fore-
going, PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, to Bert L. Dart, DART, 
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Robin L. Hough, 
Plaintiff, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Joel E. Colley, 
Defendant, Appellant and 
Cross-Respondent. 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Orme. 
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OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 880123-CA 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff and defendant both appeal from a judgment of 
the trial court dismissing plaintiff's claim for divorce of an 
alleged common-law marriage and dissolving a partnership the 
court found existed between the parties. We affirm. 
Plaintiff Robin Hough and defendant Joel Colley met in 
August 1972 while students at the University of Texas in 
Galveston, Texas. Defendant was in his last year of medical 
school and plaintiff was majoring in occupational therapy. 
They began living together solely to share expenses and 
utilities, but shortly thereafter developed an emotional, 
sexual relationship. Defendant graduated in the spring of 1973 
and moved to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to complete a one-year 
internship. Plaintiff moved to Indianapolis to complete a 
required six-week externship prior to graduation. Once 
plaintiff completed her externship, she joined defendant in 
Pennsylvania and obtained employment as an occupational 
therapist. The parties pooled their resources and opened a 
joint checking account, but also maintained separate 
professional accounts. 
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In the summer of 1974, when defendant completed his 
internship, the parties moved to Hot Springs, Montana where 
defendant operated a private practice. The parties purchased a 
home while in Montana. After a few months, they moved to 
Arkansas. In raid-1975, they moved to Colorado where defendant 
enrolled in an anesthesiology residency program and plaintiff 
became employed as director of occupational therapy at a local 
hospital. The parties purchased a home in Colorado. 
In December 1975, defendant transferred to the University 
of Utah to complete his residency in anesthesiology. Plaintiff 
followed in early 1976, and found employment as director of 
occupational therapy at Holy Cross Hospital. In September 
1978, plaintiff made a career change to real estate. She 
enjoyed substantial success as a realtor, and began purchasing 
parcels of real estate, generally in both parties* names, but 
using defendant's professional retirement account funds for 
down payments. 
The parties separated in October 1981, and plaintiff 
filed this action in June 1982. In her complaint, plaintiff 
alleged she and defendant were married in Galveston on August. 
24, 1972. She requested a divorce and an equitable division of 
their property. Plaintiff amended her complaint in June 1983; 
alleging the parties lived together as husband and wife in 
Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, Colorado, and Utah. She also, 
alleged they purchased their several properties under a 
partnership agreement and sought an accounting and dissolution* 
of the partnership. In an amendment to her amended complaint, 
filed in January 1985, plaintiff alleged the parties cohabited 
in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana, and Colorado with the 
understanding and agreement they became married at common law 
in each state. In his answer and counterclaim, defendant 
denied the existence of any marriage or partnership. In the • 
event the court found a partnership existed, he counterclaimed 
for a return of his capital contributions. 
Trial was held on February 6 and 7, 1985. In his 
findings, conclusions, and judgment, the trial court dismissed 
with prejudice plaintiffs claim of a common-law marriage. The 
court found a partnership existed regarding the properties 
purchased in Utah. The court ordered the properties sold, all 
mortgages and other third-party obligations paid, and the net 
proceeds divided equally between the parties. 
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On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in finding no 
common-law marriage. We will not disturb the findings of the 
trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). 
Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania,, and Texas all recognize 
common-law marriages. See, e.g., People v. Lucero, 707 P.2d 
1040 (Colo. App. 1985); Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont. 
1986); In re Cumminas Estate, 330 Pa. Super. 255, 479 A.2d 537 
(1984); Salavandia v. State, 651 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1983). Three elements, common to each state, must be shown to 
establish a common-law marriage: 1) an agreement to marry; 2) 
cohabitation as husband and wife; and 3) public reputation as 
husband and wife. 
The trial court found, "[The parties] did not agree 
between themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold 
themselves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the 
requirements of a common law marriage." Although disputed, 
defendant presented substantial, competent evidence at trial to 
support the trial court's findings. The findings underlying 
the conclusion of no common-law marriage are not clearly 
erroneous and are therefore affirmed. Sather v. Pitcher, 748 
P.2d 191 (Utah App. 1987). 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in finding a 
partnership existed and in its distribution of the alleged 
partnership's assets. A partnership is defined as "an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1981). Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-37(2) (1981) provides: 
In settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution the following rules 
shall be observed, subject to any 
agreement to the contrary: The 
liabilities of the partnership shall rank 
in order of payment, as follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other 
than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other 
than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in 
respect of capital. 
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(d) Those owing to partners in 
respect of profits. 
(Emphasis added.) Defendant claims he and plaintiff were not 
associated in a business for profit. Even assuming a 
partnership existed, defendant contends the court erred in not 
first returning to him his capital contributions. 
The trial court found: 
[T]he parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they would share 
equally in all the property and the 
proceeds thereon. It was understood and 
agreed that the plaintiff would devote all 
her time and talents to the property and 
defendant would contribute money but that 
both would share on an equal basis. 
• • . 
[A]ny mortgages signed by both parties for 
monies loaned by defendant's profit 
sharing plan . . . are to be recognized 
as valid. If there are mortgages signed 
only by the defendant, the court finds 
they are self-serving and do not 
constitute liabilities against the 
partnership assets. 
. . . 
[A]ny contributions made by either of the 
parties • • . should be deemed part of 
their common effort and matched by the 
efforts and services of the other party 
for which no further accounting should be 
required. 
Any funds put into the partnership by the 
defendant were capital contributions 
matched by the efforts of plaintiff. 
Although disputed, plaintiff presented substantial, competent 
evidence at trial to support the court's findings. The trial 
court's finding of a partnership is not clearly erroneous and 
is therefore affirmed. Given the court's finding of an express 
agreement to "share equally,* which is also supported by 
sufficient evidence, the distribution scheme of section 
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48-1-37(2) is inapplicable and the court's distribution of the 
partnership assets is not clearly erroneous. 
The judgment is affirmed. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench/ Judge 
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P I L E D 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Robin L. Hough, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Joel E. Colley, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
71988 
ORDER 
i*f to* Court 
i Graft of Appeal* 
No. 880123-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY H 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant• 
Memorandum Decision 
Civil No. D82-3064 
This mmttmr was tried before the court on February 6, 
1983. Written arguments have been submitted by each counsel. 
Both counsel have done an exhaustive job in researching the 
law and an excellent job in presenting the facts. 
The parties commenced living together in Galveston, 
Texas, in August» 1972. Both were students and found 
initially that they could share expenses and save money by 
living together. They grew up in an era when living together 
was a vogue among many young people. The defendant obtained 
his medical degree and they moved from Texas to Pennsylvania 
to Montana to Colorado mnd to Utah. All of the foregoing 
states except Utah recognize a "common law marriage1'. The 
first issue before the court is whether the parties have 
formed a common law marriage in any one of the jurisdictions. 
The elements of such a m^rrirnqm mppmmr to be substantially 
the same in each of these jurisdictions, namely,. (1) the 
parties must have agreed between themselves to be married; 
A-7
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(2) after such an agreement th#y must have lived together as 
man and wife) and <3> they must have held themselves out to 
the public as man and wife. Certainlv, in this case there is 
no doubt that they lived together as man and wife. This 
court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden 
of proof as to the other two elements and therefore holds 
that there is no common law marriage. 
During their "relationship" the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate here in Utah. The court finds that 
as to this property the parties were partners with an agreed 
understanding that they were sharing equally in all of the 
property. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote her time and talent to the property and that the 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
50-50. The partnership property consists of the following! 
(1) 780 Northcliffe; (2) contract receivable on 1358 Roberta; 
<3> 382 Leslie* (4) 520 - 9th Avenue* <5> Dmmr valley lot? 
(6) 231 Browning| (7) 514 East Wilson* 770 South 7th East; 
(8) Flatfheadv Montana) <9) Hot Springs, Montana) (10) Nephi 
land) and (11) Spring Creek property. As to all other assets 
the court finds that the parties acquired these in their sole 
and separate property. The court finds that any funds put 
into these properties by the defendant were capital 
contributions matched by the efforts of the plaintiff. All 
of these properties should be liquidated and after paying any 
obligations to third parties the net proceeds should be 
divided equally between the parties. 
Under these circumstances neither attorney's fees nor 
costs should be awarded to either party. 
Dated this i „ „ day of March, 1985. 
Dean E^ Conder, 
District Judge. 
Copies o-f the foregoing to be mailed to each cou 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
VS. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and defendant appear-
ing in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and wit-
nesses including the parties having been sworn and testified, 
and exhibits having been received and the matter having been 
argued and submitted, and the Court having received post-trial 
briefs and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there 
having been further argument on the interpretation and content 
of the Memorandum Decision, the Court now being fully advised, 
hereby makes the following! 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties commenced living together in Galveston, 
Texas, in August 1972. Both were students and sheared expenses 
and money by living together. They moved from Texas to Pennsyl-
vania, to Montana, to Colorado and to Utah. All the foregoing 
n* 
«~ .*«ry 
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states except Utah recognizes common law marriage. The parties 
resided with each other until late October, 1981, when they 
separated. 
2. During the nine-year period, defendant completed 
his last year of medical school at the University of Texas, 
a one-year internship at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
two years of residency in anesthesiology at the University 
of Colorado and the University of Utah. During this time 
the plaintiff obtained her college degree in Occupational 
Therapy. The parties lived together, filed joint income tax 
returns and purchased property. They did not agree between 
themselves to be married and did not sufficiently hold them-
selves out to the public as husband and wife to meet the re-
quirements of a common law marriage. The court finds that 
there was no common law marriage between these parties. 
3. During their relationship, the parties have acquired 
substantial real estate in the state of Utah and as to this 
property, the court finds the parties were partners under 
circumstances where each of the parties committed his or her 
total time, effort and talents to the partnership. This 
partnership is further evidenced by the manner in which the 
parties purchased the properties and held title and applica-
tions they filed for fidelity bonds in which they reflected 
their common ownership. 
4. The parties ceased residing together on October 30, 
1981. 
A-ll 
5* On July 30# 1982, plaintiLC filed this action for 
divorce. In June, 1983, plaintiff amended her complaint and 
also alleged that a partnership existed between plaintiff 
and defendant which partnership plaintiff requested be dissolved 
and that the assets of the partnership be equitably distributed. 
6. The court finds that as to the real estate holdings 
of the parties hereinafter set forth in the next following 
paragraph, the parties were partners with an agreed understanding 
that they would share equally in all the property and the 
proceeds thereon. It was understood and agreed that the plaintiff 
would devote all her time and talents to the property and 
defendant would contribute money but that both would share 
on an equal basis. 
7. The partnership property consists of the following: 
a. 780 Northcliffe, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
b. Contract receivable at 1358 Roberta, Salt Lake 
City, Utah* 
c. 382 Leslie, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
d. 520 - 9th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
e. Lot, Deer Valley, Utah; 
f. 231 Browning, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
g. 514 East Wilson, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
h. 770 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
i. Flathead, Montana; 
j. Hot Springs, Montana; 
k. Nephi, Utah; 
1. Spring Creek property. 
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As to all other assets acquired during the relationship 
of the parties, the court finds the parties acquired these 
as their sole and separate property and not in partnership 
except as to properties in which the parties expressly had 
a partnership agreement which includes a half-interest in 
a lot in Cuernavaca, Mexico, and a partnership relating to 
a duplex on the west side of Salt Lake City-
8. The court further finds that as to any mortgages 
signed by both parties for monies loaned by defendant's profit 
sharing plan that said mortgages and liabilities thereon are 
to be recognized as valid. If there are mortgages signed 
only by the defendant, the court finds they are self-serving 
and do not constitute liabilities against the partnership 
assets. 
9. The partnership agreement between the parties relating 
to the assets provided in paragraph 7 above terminated upon 
the trial of this case, and any contributions made by either 
of the parties to that time should be deemed part of their 
common effort and matched by the efforts and services of the 
other party for which no further accounting should be required. 
10. Any funds put into the partnership by the defendant 
were capital contributions matched by the efforts of plaintiff. 




CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was no common law marriage between the parties, 
and the parties are not husband and wife. 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time shall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required. 
3. All the properties are ordered to be liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proceeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties. 
4. Plaintiff's first cause of action and all other causes 
based upon the existence of a common law marriage should be 
dismissed. 
5# No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
A DATED thia ' * day of October, 1985. 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
VS. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
J U D G M E N T 
CIVIL NO. D 82-3064 
Hon. Dean E. Conder 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 6th, 7th and 8th of February, 1985, plaintiff appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L- Dart, and defendant appearing 
in person and by his attorney, J. Thomas Bowen, and witnesses 
including the parties having been sworn and testified, and 
exhibits having been received and the matter having been argued 
and submitted, and the court having received post-trial briefs 
and having entered its Memorandum Decision, and there having 
been further argument on the interpretation and content of 
the Memorandum Decision, and the court now being fully advised 
and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action and all other causes 
of action based upon the existence of a common law marriage 
are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, no cause of action. 
A- 15 
2. There was a partnership agreement between the parties 
relating to the real properties set forth in paragraph 7 of 
the Findings of Fact, which partnership was terminated at 
the time of the trial of this case, and any contributions 
made by either of the parties to that time shall be deemed 
part of their common effort matched by the efforts and services 
of the other party for which no further accounting is required. 
3. All the properties are ordered to be liquidated and 
after paying any obligations to third parties, net proeeds 
are to be divided equally between the parties* 
4. No attorney's fees or costs are awarded to either 
party. 
p DATED this / 6 day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT; 
^^Le^V&to^ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Trial Court No. D82-3064 
Court of Appeals No. 
880123-CA 
Supreme Court No. 
ORDER 
Based upon defendant's Ex parte Motion and good cause 
appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, 
Defendant shall have until 5:00 p.m. on October 14, 
1988, to file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this matter, 
DATED th is n 
-tfd^ 
day of September, 1988. 
/ y?l-a^<-<:.. --(^ p 
SUPREME COURT JUDGE 
22.14 
A-I7 
